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SCORNED HAZARDS OF URBAN LAND MARKETS: ‘ TlIE CARNIVAL 
of Excess’ in late-nineteenth century Melbourne* * 
John C. Weaver** 
‘The Rise and Fall of Marvellous Melbourne’—the title of Graeme 
Davison's chronicle of a late-nineteenth century boom and bust—is a settled 
expression for a renowned event in Australian history.1 Before Davison's 
account, die sequence of stunning growth and collapse caught Asa Briggs' 
attention. In Victorian Cities, Briggs—whose essays sought to portray 
Victorian civic culture in Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Middlesbrough, 
Melbourne, and London—proposed that the depression of the early 1890s 
altered Melbourne’s personality. Once bustling, confident, and brash, 
Melbourne beheld such a grim reversal of family fortunes and civic works that, 
in his estimation, it never regained a comparable reckless belief in unfettered 
growth.2 Underlying the shift in mood was an economic fluctuation of grand 
proportions. 
Although well-known, it is useful to review the trajectory of collapse. A 
slow down in real estate transactions in late 1888 is the conventional beginning. 
Starting in 1889 higher than usual numbers of builders, estate agents, and 
speculators failed. This continued through to 1894. Financial institutions of all 
The research for this paper was supported by Australian National University and the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I would like to thank Janine Bush, 
my research assistant at ANU, and to express my appreciation for the assistance I received 
from the staff at The Noel Butlin Archives Centre, the University of Melbourne Archives 
the Victoria Public Record Office, and the La Trobe Library. The Urban Research Unit at 
ANU provided a hospitable and stimulating environment in which to work. 
McMaster University 
* ^avison, j_he_Rise_and Fall of Marvellous Melbourne (Melbourne: University of 
Melbourne Press, 1978). J 
2 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (Pelican Books, 1971), 286-7. First published in 1963. 
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sorts were implicated in the real estate market. An alarming number of 
building societies and land mortgage banks failed in 1891 and 1892, and a wave 
of reorganisation among major banks transpired in 1893. As an organising 
centre for pastoral and mining ventures, Melbourne was integrated into London 
finance, international investment and population movements affected the 
colonial city.3 Unquestionably, its rise and fall was linked to the international 
business cycle of the late-nineteenth century. Yet Melbourne's collapse was 
extreme. 
One explanation for this is that the excesses of a boom necessitated a severe 
correction. Taking aim at what he felt were such ‘mechanistic’ accounts of the 
great financial failure of 1893, A.R. Hall argued that the most catastrophic 
phase of die bust, which culminated in the reorganisation of banks in 1893, 
originated in a lack of confidence that might have been averted. Hall proposed 
diat the government of Victoria could have saved the situation in March 1893 
by declaring all bank notes legal tender, thereby helping financial institutions to 
meet demands from depositors. 3 4 With that expansion of money and official 
vote of confidence, the fundamental solidity of Melbourne's economy could 
have prevailed. As a corollary. Hall suggested that the city's land boom was 
essentially justified.5 ‘There was a firm basis for much of the behaviour which 
3 N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development. 1861-1900 fCanrihrirW- a, 
the University Press, 1964), 187-8. -- S 
4 Hall is critical of Henry Gyles Turner's history of Victoria for its moralism about the 
excesses of the boom, but Turner's account of the rise and fall also includes a discussion of 
how the government of New South Wales saved Sydney by declaring bank notes legal 
tender. See Henry Gyles Turner, A History of the Colony of Victoria from its Discovery tn 
its Absorption into the Commonwealth of Victoria in Two Volumes, vol.2 (London: 
Longman, Green,and Co., 1904), 314. 
5 A.R. Hall, The Stock Exchange of Melbourne and the Victorian Economy (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1968), 113-176. The dispute is well summarised by 
Graeme Davison. ‘The degree to which the economic collapse of the early nineties is 
attributable to [a] pattern of extended investment in suburban development is still a matter 
contested by economic historians. On the one side [represented by S.J. Butlin) it is argued 
that die criteria for investment were not those of profitability, that the returns on some 
investments, particularly in services, were declining in the 'eighdes, that borrowed capital 
was increasingly diverted into speculation; on the other (A.R. Hall), it has to be conceded 
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has subsequently come to be regarded as a demonstration of sheer optimism and 
extravagance.’* * * * * 6 How sound was die city's economy? Could wise action late in 
the day have saved it from a disaster? Was the real estate such a good 
investment? That such questions are raised does not mean they can be 
answered. This paper proposes, however, that an insufficient understanding of 
land as an investment and the scope of speculation in urban and suburban 
property helped push Melbourne into a crisis. Swift government action might 
have had little effect, because die want of confidence in Victorian banking was 
more than psychologically based.7 Financial institutions had entangled 
diemselves in a web of loans that tied them to the building cycle; depositors who 
widtdrew reacted rationally to revelations that many financial institutions—not 
merely a corrupt few—had heaps of over-valued securities.8 
A building cycle is a well-known rising and falling wave of investment with 
enormous amplitude and remarkable regularity.9 Peaks have occurred at 
that many service enterprises, particularly those enjoying monopolies, were showing 
healthy profits at least until 1889-90. Nevertheless, whether as cause or consequence, it is 
indisputable that the depression of the early 'nineties saw suburban services straightened in 
just those areas where they had been fully extended in the late 'eighties.’ See Davison 
‘Public Utilities and the Expansion of Melbourne in the 1880s’, Australian Economic ’ 
History Review, vol.10 (September, 1970), 187. 
6 Hall, The Stock Exchange of Melbourne 129. 
7 Hall's contrast between those who explained the crash as a product of the excesses of the 
boom and those who stressed the possibility of averting a crisis by a strong government 
„ ?n ’a uv !h°x a COf,(!en]Ce para!,els differences among classic statements on business- 
cycle. Alfred Marshall advanced the idea that investment was primarily driven by 
psychological factors whereas Albert Aftalion articulated a masterful statement for the view 
that business cycles resulted from reasoning that nevertheless caused investors to overshoot 
equilibrium, causing booms and busts. For an old but very lucid account of these ^id oth^r 
theories see Alvin Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income (New York W W 
'% Crmpanyn 951)’,259-76 (on theori^of confidence and credit)!and 347 76 (on theories dealing with the reabty overproduction). u - / /o (on 
9 Bp?ines8 Fluctuations (New York: Harper & Brothers 19321 70Q 
roughly twenty year intervals. Essentially, this cycle has resulted from 
imperfect information about the demand for real property and lags in the 
property industry that hinder quick adjustments.10 The broad objective of this 
paper is to re-examine the Melbourne building cycle by focusing on land as a 
commodity which poses valuation and liquidity problems. Beyond new 
narrative details, three contributions to the extensive literature on Melbourne's 
rise and fall are made in this discussion. First, the experience that banks in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada had with land as collateral will 
be considered in relation to practices in Victoria. Second, a discussion of failed 
land boomers will connect land speculation to the severity of the slump. 
Finally, the liquidation ol real property will be analysed to explore what 
transpires in the depths and aftermath of a serious crisis. 
Essentially, building cycles are traced through data on building material or 
building permits, but die following discussion considers investment in land as 
well as buildings. The deviations from a conventional abstraction in order to 
include land are readily explained and it is recognised too that there are good 
reasons based in the history of economic theory for treating land alone. Land is 
included with shelter and business blocks because it is fundamental to the 
fabrication of usable urban space. Its cost represents a significant portion of 
investment in all lorms of urban space. Many of the individuals who invested in 
real property in die Melbourne boom assembled portfolios of rural land, city 
allotments, and land with buildings. In its guise as security, land has been 
intrinsic to Financing speculative building ventures. As foundation material for 
city building and as an asset marshalled to procure borrowed capital for city 
building—and rural improvement schemes to increase its own carrying 
capacity—land is an unusual commodity. Land has also posed valuation 
problems and, compared to many odier assets, lacks liquidity. Real property 
Id Hansen. Business Cycles and National Income. 51. 
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shares these two problems with land, though the rental of built space can assist 
with valuation and with liquidity. 
Building cycles have usually been documented with aggregate data. 
Largely by analysing official data, E.A. Boehm prepared a model economic 
history, dealing at length with the events of 1887 to 1897. Boehm wielded 
statists' reports and contemporary newspaper accounts to infer a great deal 
about the calculations of those who participated in the boom.11 Along with 
Davison's history, his book remains an indispensable guide. It is possible, 
however, to get closer to participants in the Melbourne events. Extensive 
evidence—qualitative as well as quantitative—can track the building cycle, 
explain the city's slow recovery, and do so with close attention to participants. 
Commentary on the Melbourne Ordeal 
Some insights into Melbourne's rise and fall can be gleaned from 
participants and observers. Contemporaries immediately published 
assessments. Several Melbourne authors—bankers or accountants—larded 
these with affirmations of integrity, understandable in view of the revelations 
of misconduct that followed the collapse of certain financial institutions. Most 
contemporary analysts had a shallow understanding of the crisis and knew less 
about economic cycles generally. Writing in 1892, James Mirams, the manager 
of a failed building society who was later convicted of fraud, understandably 
rejected the idea that a land boom led to the collapse. Instead, as a protectionist, 
he blamed Victoria's balance of payments deficit and a British engineered 
contraction of credit* Why had the colony a balance of trade problem and 
what caused the contraction of credit, a contraction which pushed building 
1 a"d Depr-Sl°n in Auslralia '«£M897 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971). 
12 James Mirams, 
1892), 10-15. ure (Melbourne: Hanson & Co., 
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societies like his to the wall? Maurice Brodzky, brother-in-law of a major real 
estate speculator and editor of the muckraking journal Table Talk alleged that 
speculations by the likes of Mirams undermined the credit system.13 
Swindles occurred, particularly during the onset of the crisis when a few 
institutional lenders practiced chicanery to stay alive, but more basic to the 
origins ol trouble were errors in judgment about the supply and demand as well 
as the valuation and liquidity of urban space. Henry Gyles Turner, General 
Manager of the Commercial Bank during the boom and bust, ascribed the 
collapse to excessive government borrowing, reckless personal spending by 
business leaders, dishonoured contracts, and a strike by dockworkers.14 He too 
wrote of ‘insidious wiles and brazen mendacity’. 15 An engaging author who 
submitted shrewd observations and a many-sided account of the collapse, 
Turner was disingenuous by omission. In the 1880s, his bank lent to speculators 
whom he condemned later for lavish living and ungentlemanly conduct. By 
reciting details and proposing a ‘carnival of excess’, he avoided recanting his 
trust in land as security. 
On the eve of the depression of the 1930s, George Meudell, an accountant 
who had worked for the biggest land boomer of the 1880s, Benjamin Fink, 
scattered facts and opinions in a breezy memoir. Like Brodzky, he blamed 
speculators. Meudell often mentioned that shoddy land valuation practices 
made speculators possible. If only the general managers of failed banks, he 
wrote, ‘had kept clowns to make fun of valuations of city property, made by the 
*3 This statement about Table Talk may fairly express the tone of its many stories on the 
collapse, but within its numerous articles many explanations for the boom and bust are 
provided. It really is much more than a source for details on the improper conduct by the 
officers of financial institutions. S.J. Butlin assembled a collection of photocopies of 
articles on banking that appeared in Table Talk and my references to it are taken from his 
papers at the Noel Butlin Archives Centre, incorporating the Australian National University 
Archives of Business and Labour, at Australian National University (henceforth ANU). 
14 Henry Gyles Turner, A History of the Colony of Victoria from its Absorption into the 
Commonwealth of Australia (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904), 264-304. 
I5 Ibid.. 291. 
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old-fashioned auctioneers and valuators of Melbourne, their banks would never 
have closed their doors.’16 Turner could not concede this, for he had 
obstinately championed land as good security for bank loans. 
Astute post mortems came from outside Melbourne. Two will be cited. In 
a series of articles for the Sydney Morning Herald, collected in a pamphlet, 
Edward Pulsford analysed the crisis using trade and investment data; these 
showed Victoria's borrowing in the 1880s surpassed that of other Australian 
colonies. While Pulsford regarded debt as no evil, he supposed that the 
proportion held abroad was a problem. Drawing a distinction between the 
wealth in a country and the wealth of a country, he argued that British investors 
had poured wealth into Victoria, but the colony could not meet an urgent 
repayment schedule.^ The immediate causes of the crisis were exogenous! a 
curtailment of British credit and demands for repayment. 
Pulsford did more than refine Miram's explanation. In his estimation, an 
incautious use of statistics helped entice UK funds. Comparing statistics to 
edged tools that required care and knowledge, he stated that Australasian 
statistics had hidden assumptions and were misused to give ‘very exaggerated 
ideas on the development... of these colonies.’18 The one comparative 
handbook on world economies in the 1880s and 1890s was by M.G. MulhaU. It 
depicted a remarkable growth of wealth in Australia. Pulsford warned that 
much of the increase was in but not of the colony; much of the wealth data 
embodied real estate assessments. MulhaU reported the surprising information 
that the per capita wealth of the UK in 1890 was £247, £210 in the US, £196 in 
Canada, and £370 in Australia. But sixty to seventy per cent of Australia's 
&a»a!d189^27,.^°tgS 0n Capital and Fin?mgjL-in Australasia (Sydney: Edwards, Dunlop 
18 Pulsford> NatsamCamial and Finanr. 29. 
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wealth was in real estate whose value, Pulsford stressed, fluctuated enormously. 
Like Meudell, he placed his finger on the problem of real estate valuation.19 
Soon after the banking crisis phase of the crash, in the spring of 1893, the 
chief clerk for the British treasury asked one of his juniors, Arthur Peel, to 
report on the failure ol Australian banks. Printed for internal use, Peel’s well- 
known paper circulated widely. While he acknowledged that the banks were 
not responsible for the fall in commodity prices which embarrassed their 
clients, he scorned the securities banks had taken. Peel blamed Australian banks 
for their plight. His list of dubious securities included mining and tramway 
shares, city allotments, and pastoral properties. Banks, Peel explained, reaped 
great profits from pastoral accounts through commissions and exchange 
dealings. To secure pastoral business, they lent heavily to graziers. Peel 
approved or livestock or wool clips as security, for they were consumable, 
quickly liquidated if necessary. In tune with English banking principles, 
however, he rated land as unsound security, due to the variability of prices. 
Worse, banks had speculated in land and continued to prop up speculators after 
the initial signs of a faltering land market in 1889.20 
Alfred Marshall did not mention the Melbourne boom in his Principles of 
Economics (1890), but he described a state of affairs that could well have been 
inspired by events in Victoria. Marshall described a situation where ‘a handful 
of colonists having assumed rights of perpetual property in vast tracts of rich 
land, are anxious to reap in their own generation its future fruits.’ They 
accomplished this, he continued, by mortgaging their property to the old world 
‘at very high rates of interest’.21 Max Hirsch, writing for Table Talk, was 
aware of this discussion and cited it as authority to refute one of Turner's 
19 Pulsford, Notes on Capital and Finance. 35. 
20 Arthur George Villiers Peel, The Australian Crisis of 1893 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1893), 4-14. 
21 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan and Co., 1898), 756. 
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lectures on the causes of the depression. Hirsch thought that Turner had 
wrongly minimised the responsibility of the financial institutions for the heavy 
private borrowing in Britain.22 
Writing in 1927 to warn Australians of the likelihood of another collapse, 
economic historian E.O.A. Shann, prepared a booklet about Melbourne’s boom 
and bust. Although preoccupied with two exogenous causes of the business 
cycle—commodity prices and international credit—he included a synopsis of 
the land boom and its aftermath.23 It is remarkable that he did not argue more 
emphatically that the crisis had some of its origin in the endogenous 
circumstances of city building, in the demand for urban space. External links 
were decisive for his commodity and credit argument, consequently he gave the 
impression that British lending to government and private sectors in Victoria 
had forced urban growth, had made available more capital than the economy 
could healthily absorb, and had made the land boomers possible. Conceiving of 
the land boom as unnatural and forced, he stopped short of examining the 
business decisions which influenced the investment demand schedule for urban 
space.24 
It is surprising that Shann failed to press further in his discussion of the land 
market, because both here and in An Economic History of Ausfralia he slipped 
in a provocative and clever observation about land markets.25 Extreme 
fluctuations in the price of land, he suggested, occur because of the absence of a 
22 Table Talk. 13 May 1892. 
2^ Edward Shann, The Boom of 1890 - and Now (Sydney: The Cornstalk Press, 1927), 34 
24™®linKeStment defmand schedu|e may shift so that investors are willing to pay higher costs 
purely by reason of extravagant expectations. The propelling wave of ODtimism whirh 
cannot be justified on the basis of sound and close calculation is the source of this shift 
ssrct:1 Shmn ek>“ “ •*** 
25 
1930)^3 nhann’ -Aatofimi£liiaprY Q( (Cambridge: At the University Press. 
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futures market.26 Authors of models based on endogenous factors were 
interested in why investors in capital goods would over-shoot the mark in the 
boom phase and over-correct during the recession phase. In Shann's aside 
about the lack of a futures market and in the business cycle theories that 
accented endogenous explanations, there are leads into a discussion about land 
markets and the building cycle. However, Shann did not write in that vein. He 
was alerting Australians to the consequences of a fall in commodity prices, a 
vital concern in a staples exporting country. Still, it is a measure of the trauma 
of Melbourne s crash that he used it as a cautionary tale. 
Briggs claim that the collapse of the 1890s affected the personality of 
Melbourne is confirmed by the enduring interest of Melbournians in the 
benchmark event. For generations, the rise and fall have been palpable, 
unavoidably a part of the modem city. Calling attention to boom development, 
civic boosters have actually promoted Melbourne as one of the world's great 
Victorian cities. And so it is. A tram rider on the high streets of older suburbs 
can see the effects of boom and bust by reading the construction dates that, 
along with masonry urns, often adorn parapets on rows of shops. Along block 
after block, the years rumble by, through the 1870s and 1880s, then leap past 
It can be objected on at least three grounds that the absence of a futures market is an 
insubstantial proposition. First, land, it can be argued, is an asset which cannot, to any 
significant extent, be produced. Futures markets apply to commodities which are produced 
and for which the uncertainty of future production is a one cause of price fluctuations. 
Second, futures markets function only where large quantities of a graded commodity are 
traded. Is land capable of being sorted into a few well-defined grades of produce? Third, it 
might be said that land is now widely used as an appropriate form of security without a 
futures market. Consequently, such a market was not necessary to realise stability. There 
are responses to these objections. In the first place, Shann does not seem to be arguing that 
a futures market is feasible, only that it did not exist and, therefore, there could be no strong 
marketplace check exercised by sceptics. Second, can it be maintained that land in a certain 
sense is not produced? Urban allotments are produced and there is considerable 
standardisation in the property industry. In a more general way, cadastral mapping and land 
registration systems - the legal apparatus - produces land. Finally, the use of land as a more 
secure asset today is a result of many historical processes that have resulted - with some 
important exceptions - in greater prudence. Moreover, government regulation and planning 
affect production, smoothing out some extremes. As well, some jurisdictions have 
government and/or private mortgage insurance. In effect, the impossibility of futures 
market has forced the development of other measures and practices. 
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the tum-of-the century, leaving a gap of a decade. Of course, inquiring 
members of established families still scan Michael Cannon’s 1'he Land Boomers 
to locate rogue ancestors in his gallery of miscreants.27 
Published in 1966, Cannon’s tales documented instances of insider loans and 
embezzlements affecting select clusters of allied land and banking companies.28 
Often relying on Table Talk, Cannon let muckraking stand as an interpretation. 
Critical of the hypocrisy of moral reformers and erstwhile philanthropists 
caught robbing innocent investors by sundry means, he ran with a lively story 
and skipped the fact that many heavy speculators were guileless and guiltless. 
Precisely this point was made in a perceptive review by E. A. Beever and R.D. 
Freeman.29 More will be said about the backgrounds of land speculators later. 
Cannon's outrage centred on both the ease with which speculators carried out 
their schemes, the practices used to keep failing enterprises afloat from 1889 to 
1892, and the loopholes they dexterously wriggled through when escaping 
penalties. He was right to suggest that Victoria's laws governing banking and 
company conduct were permissive. Meudell's and Pulsford’s criticism of land 
valuation, Peel’s distrust of land as security, Marshall insight into colonial 
capitalism, Shann s observation about the lack of a futures market for land, and 
Cannon s scorn for indulgent laws all converge at a leading cause of 
Melbourne s exaggerated cycle. Victoria fostered risky connections between 
banking and land markets. 
Economic historian E.A. Boelim was next to publish on the rise and fall, as 
part of a study of prosperity and depression in Australia from 1887 to 1897. 
^'la™ - Canberra, a 
Cannon. In fact, he was. y that h,S grandfather was mentioned by 
28Fafpnted1nT96?X"—C™ (Melb°Ume; University of Melbourne Press, 1977). 
29196A7)B122er and RD' Freeman> ‘DireCtors of D‘“'. Jh^nsmicRecm, (March, 
His crisp account of Victoria s building boom and its liquidation was 
sophisticated. In his larger project, he demonstrated the force of outside 
influences on the Australian economy and the role of internal elements, fusing 
the contrasting explanations proposed by Hall. Boehm placed Australia in the 
London-based world economy. Among the local ingredients, he pointed to ‘the 
full-blooded building boom in Melbourne’ which arose from the urge for home 
ownership, population growth, speculative activities that exaggerated present 
and future demand lor houses, and lags and inertia endemic to city-building 
industries.30 Even so, why had investors by—say—1888 grossly miscalculated 
immediate and future demands? 
Four years after this book appeared, R. Silberberg contributed the first of 
several innovative papers on the boom. His initial article showed how investors 
could have believed that superior profits awaited them in the suburban land 
market. In a sample of transactions from 1880 to 1892, he found rates of return 
exceeding those in alternative investments from 1882 to 1888. The average 
weighted return was nearly 35 per cent on an average investment period of just 
under four years. ‘These returns were such as to suggest that land investment 
was a great deal more profitable than was necessary to compensate investors for 
the associated loss of liquidity.’31 It is far from settled, however, that investors 
recognised they were relinquishing liquidity. During the boom, the liquidity 
problem had been ignored and even denied in good faith by influential business 
leaders. Thus, though prospective investors may have witnessed seductive rates 
' of return—trade journals gave them roughly the same results as Silberberg's 
30 Boehm, Prosperity and Depression. 152. 
31 R. Silberberg, ‘Rates of Return on Melbourne Land Investment, 1880-92’, The Economic 
Record (June, 1975), 217. Table Talk made occasional references to the profits reaped by 
‘orchardists’, ‘market gardeners’, and early speculators. Table Talk. 23 September and 30 
December 1892. 
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later research32—they were inadequately informed about land as an investment. 
Part of the explanation for the disaster is die state of information in the 
Melbourne land market. 
In 1978, Graeme Davison covered the events of the rise and fall from the 
perspective of urban history, providing chronological sequence and, along with 
Boehm, giving substance to prior generalisations about the ‘unnatural’ rate of 
Melbourne’s growth. Not only did he describe the city's financial, commercial, 
and industrial evolution, but demonstrated diat die metropolitan region 
achieved a degree of low density settlement virtually unique among large cities. 
The construction of the houses, urban services, and public buildings produced a 
remarkable suburban spread, one whose development employed thousands. As 
growth slackened in 1888, contractors, carpenters, masons, and related trades 
suffered immediately. Davison associated the crisis widi city building and 
accented special properties in Melbourne's spatial development. 
The following account of Melbourne’s building cycle accepts die 
uncommon features of the city s expansion and die laxity of Victoria's laws 
governing financial institutions. Indeed, the unfettered quality of die boom of 
the 1880s that made the Melbourne experience unusual also makes it suitable for 
an understanding of the building cycle and of land as a commodity. The fact that 
this city sprawled into surrounding rural lands, unrestrained by planning, 
prudent banking practices, or legislative restrictions on corporate conduct 
means diat it offers an example of free enterprise and city building. Granted, 
the supply of urban space was influenced by government activity, diough not 
regulation. Throughout the 1880s, the government-operated railway system 
assisted private land syndicates. In every respect, the market for urban space 
was unobstructed. 
B"x,on Ply-L,d ■ *** s* 
The article compared values !n ijgo offt7VnV 25 ^ >888' 
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Melbourne's experiment—for such it was—advanced, unchecked by the 
voluntary restraints of a circumspect business community and unrestrained by 
government supervision of business. In recent articles, David Merritt has 
considered the problem of a lack of prudential standards and weighed the pros 
and cons of more forceful government regulations. On balance, he maintains 
that higher standards would have had ‘negative impacts on the growth of 
income through lower levels of financial intermediation and a diminished rate 
of capital formation.’ Finding a silver lining, he credits the crash with 
instructing later bankers in more judicious conduct which meant that the 
banking system of the depression of the 1930s was stronger than it had been in 
the 1890s.33 However, in favour of more stringent regulation, it can be pointed 
out that the Canadian banking system was more rigorously controlled with no 
discemable lack of capital formation. Moreover, the Melbourne crash did 
more than teach valuable lessons. It undermined enterprise and tied up capital 
for many years in assets that were difficult to liquidate.34 
Context, Culture, and Information 
Hie urban boom of the 1880s was a prime instance of capital investment 
having seriously overshot ‘the neighbourhood of equilibrium’. In this instance, 
the capital investment was for urban space. By urban space, we mean two 
things: first, raw land which had been converted from rural to urban 
allotments; second, built areas used lor shelter or business. The many 
33 David T. Merrett, ‘Australian Banking Practices and the Crisis of 1893’, Australian 
Economic History Review, vol. 29 (March 1989), 83. Also see David T. Merrett, 
Preventing Bank Failure: Could the Commercial Bank of Australia have been saved by its 
peers in 1893?’, Victorian Historical Journal, vol.64 (October 1993), 139. 
3^ It has also been argued that late Victorian booms in Adelaide and Melbourne accelerated the 
spread of water and sewer services and thus improved sanitation and health. ‘The booms 
therefore may have touched off permanent changes in the quality of urban life.’ See W.A. 
Sinclair, ‘Urban Booms in Nineteenth-Century Australia: Adelaide and Melbourne’, Journal 
pf the Historical Society of South Australia, number 10 (1982), 12. Also see David 
Dunstan, ‘Dirt and Disease’, in Graeme Davison, David Dunstan and Chris McConville 
editors The Outcasts of Melbourne (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 170. 
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particular reasons why investment in urban space—land and buildings—bolted 
ahead of current requirements may be compressed: the local business culture 
and the quality of information available to investors. 
Melbourne's business culture evolved unorthodox inclinations within the 
innovative Australasian colonies. As a new settlement region, Australia shared 
with the United States and Canada the problem of attracting capital. Australian 
colonies faced the additional complication of being closely scrutinised by the 
colonial office which discouraged departure from conservative English 
business practices.35 Tight effective control, however, was attenuated by lags in 
communication. Experiments became accomplished facts before London could 
disallow them. To meet their needs, merchants and pastoralists successfully 
embarked on financial modifications that violated English practice. The 
lending on security of a future wool clip pioneered in the early 1840s is well 
known, but as Peel suggested this oddity entailed less risk than lending on land. 
Wool and sheep can be consumed. There were other novel practices. 
By the 1830s, private lenders and banks were doing two things that English 
ones could not do though many American ones could, sometimes with 
calamitous results.36 First, they transgressed and then changed the law against 
usury. In short, they charged higher rates of interest titan permitted in 
England.37 That made colonial investments attractive. Second, banks extended 
35 Imperial supervision of Australia was more enduring than that for Canada The control 
over crown lands ,s a notable case. See Peter Burroughs. nmam and A srnrli uL- 
Agady m Jmpenal RelaticmsimdO^^ 
see Morton 
Harvard University Press, 1977) 237-45 An 1817 181Q i'91S^f3’bnc,?e’ Massachusetts: 
combined with the launching of numerous new hanl'J Vf?°m,m ,he United S,ates 
profit from land speculationST^serious fiSdSS? <o 
Public Lands in Jacksonian Pnlirie, Fe'ler’ ^ 
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their business irom discounting commercial paper to lending on the security of 
real property. Higher colonial interest rates were an important innovation, but 
the eruption of institutional lending on landed security was an even more 
critically important change. 
The banks involvement with land had a complicated history, because by die 
late 1860s—when widespread and illegal practices were exposed and 
discussed—banks operated under British charters or colonial charters and acts. 
Drafted at different times, these bore various stipulations about lending on die 
security of a mortgage; moreover, banks which were barred from this business 
often engaged in it. Founded in 1854, the Bank of Victoria, for example, could 
not lend money on security of land, diough it could seize real property and sell 
the same to satisfy debts.38 Banks so debarred from mortgage lending 
penetrated the business by claiming they were covering overdrafts and taking 
deeds later as security.3? This sly practice received a check when a debtor 
refused to pay the National Bank in South Australia, alleging that the bank had 
made an illegal contract by accepting land as security. In 1868, the bank lost a 
suit against the debtor.40 Conservative commentators insisted prohibition was 
warranted, for banks should only lend on marketable securities and land was 
sometimes inconvertible. 
Banks continued to lend on the security of land after National Bank of 
Australasia v. Cherry even when charters or banking acts prohibited it. By 
covering overdralts and taking deeds as collateral, banks persistently evaded the 
usury law see Macdonald v. Levy (1833) in J. Gordon Legge, Selection of Supreme Court 
Cases in New South Wales (Sydney: Charles Potter, 1862), 39-64. 
O O 
Travers Adamson editor. Acts and Ordinances in Force in Victoria (Melbourne: 
Government Printer, 1855), 35-42. 
Wyatt et al editors, Supreme Court of Victoria, vol. I, Bank of Victoria v. Cozens. 93-5. 
South Australian Law Reports: Reports of cases Argued and Determined in the 
Suprgme Court of South Australia, vol.II (Adelaide: Andrews, Thomas and Clarke, 
1868)> National Bqnk of Australasia v. Cherry and Others. Assignees of S. White. 
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prohibition. Additionally, the legal entanglement of financial institutions in 
land markets had accelerated in Victoria due to an 1864 companies act which 
allowed financial institutions incorporating under it ‘to lend on land and take a 
security coincident with the advance.’41 Meanwhile, directors of banks that 
could not legally lend on the security of real property lobbied for change.42 
Shareholders of restricted banks debated whether to ignore the ban.43 Some 
relished the profits of the illegal business; others warned of the risks. 
Concurrently, building societies shed procedures originated when they 
were mutual benefit societies. Gradually, after mid-century, they emerged as 
complete lending enterprises. They too pressed hard against restrictions. In die 
case of more aggressive ones, for example, the legislated limits on loans to paid 
up capital and the percentage of a property's value that could be lent were 
ignored. Then there were the land mortgage banks which also lent on real 
estate. One of the first, the Land Mortgage Bank of Victoria founded in 1864, 
could not lend beyond fifty per cent of a valuation, but it apparently violated the 
rule and in 1876 a few shareholders wanted to inflate die official limit to 
seventy-five per cent. Banks clearly had competition in an expanding field. 
Mortgage lending flourished in the 1860s and 1870s. Melbourne was growing 
and the introduction of rural land selection spawned agriculturalists who, as 
future freeholders, would seek capital for improvements. In an atmosphere of 
growth and prosperity, against a backdrop of prior innovations, an old-country 
banking precaution was disdained. At the same dme, as Silbcrberg pointed out, 
‘the rise to dominance of the institutional lender created a more organised, and 
41 Boehm, Prosperity and Depression 220. 
4 nSS?^ ^»d S„ips, 
43 
ANU, S.J. Builin Collection, item 757, The Arens 70 rw„™w i o<o -,n.- ,. . 
repotted on a heated shareholders meeting the B^k of VictoS 8' PP’ng 
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integrated, market for |mortgage] funds.’44 Integration increased while 
participants rebuffed arguments about the liquidity risk. A great new engine 
for manufacturing credit in the city had been assembled. Formal inquiry at the 
time stressed only its merits. 
Near the peak of the boom, in 1887, a Victorian royal commission 
examined the colony’s banking laws with the aim of standardisation. It focused 
on the reserve requirements for bank notes and the lingering illegality facing 
some banks that lent on land. The commission was chaired by land boomer 
Matthew Davies and one of the other six members was Henry Gyles Turner who 
favoured lending against landed security. Boehm is generous in his estimation 
of Turner's position, suggesting that, since Australian colonial banking had 
avoided the disasters which plagued American banking, Turner felt justified in 
supporting Australian practice.4* Turner undoubtedly felt justified. The case 
that he was foolish for so feeling stands on more than hindsight. Most of the 
many bank failures in the United States and the few in Canada occurred because 
of links with real estate speculation. Of course, there had been bank failures in 
Australia after the crash of the land boom of the late 1830s. In Canada, a 
standardisation of banking laws had occurred in 1871 and it recognised the 
problems of real estate lending by prohibiting charted banks from indulging. 
The ban remained until 1953 when a government agency provided mortgage 
insurance.46 
With a leading banker like 1 umer, the head of one of the larger banks, 
approving publicly of lending on land, there was no check on real estate 
speculation. Competitors fell into line or risked a loss of business. It can be 
Institutional Investors in the Real Estate Mortgage Market in Victoria in the 
!880s , Australian Economic History Review. 18 (September, 1978), 164. 
45 Boehm, Prosperity and Depression 222-23. 
4^ Michael Bliss, Jjgrihern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 268-9; Michael Doucet and John Weaver, Housing the 
IiQUh American City (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 277-8 
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argued too that the asset quality of lending instutions deteriorated because of the 
unsettled and bustling character of Victoria: accounting skills were scarce, 
lenders seldom found clients with long business histories, and the 
environmental characteristics of grazing and agriculture were not entirely 
understood.47 Yet, uncertainty and lack of information can and should foster 
caution. Moreover, in the short history of European occupation, Australia had 
already experienced financial crises. Something else contributed to the 
embrace of high risks. In die realm of banking, a dominant strain in Australian 
business culture had defiantly chaffed against orthodoxy for a half century. 
The liquidity complication with land was not universally denied; however, the 
prevailing attitude, endorsed by government, placed more trust in colonial 
innovation than English conventions. Investors were thus ill-informed about a 
commodity that fed dieir dreams of riches. 
As an investment, land has two celebrated risks: poor liquidity and die 
potential for inflated valuations. The state of land valuations epitomised die 
common information that misguided investors, though during the boom there 
were odier spheres of faulty or incomplete information, such as financial 
institutions lending to their directors without having to make public disclosures, 
a practice barred in Canada.48 On the surface, lenders looked as if diey acted 
prudently by advancing money secured by real property merely to the value of 
60 per cent of appraised value.4* However, that margin of security may have 
been somewhat more generous than that granted in North America; more 
A 
Merrett, ‘Austalian banking practice and the crisis of 1893’, 72. 
^890°l^^ Ac, 
Essence, 'Mr™'™ (Melbourne: Roben S. Brant, Coye^.m 
in th'e cSeXa prAtSS'SS TJ bC“ S™nds -tat 
equity of redemption; in other words he Z1JJ?TS,S!'SKT S'" 'eehnically was no 
mortgagor's interests in the land were not tliluted^bv ihnsleSfd't.nC"lty. foreclosiug and the 
purchased the equity of ,edempti«SSort°f °",eis who "»» 
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importantly, the appraised value in Victoria was based on market values. 
Without a process to determine the intrinsic worth of real property, its so- 
called value originated in dubious assessments. According to Mulhall's 
handbook, land values placed Australians ahead of Britons, Americans, and 
Canadians in per capita wealth; this report—if accepted widely—was 
dangerously misleading. 
How were valuations prepared? Meudell claimed that in Melbourne 
revenue or rents were never used to test values.’5o Table Talk affirmed that 
well-known valuers ‘departed from capitalising the actual earning power of a 
property, and estimated to suit their clients.’5* In some English-speaking 
jurisdictions, assessors estimated the value of real property on the basis of 
annual potential rents factored out on the basis of a six per cent annual return on 
capital. Thus the annual rent would be multiplied by roughly fifteen to produce 
the value of the property. But since rents can fall drastically in a recession or 
depression, even this approach was imperfect. Nevertheless, it might have 
checked tampering with Melbourne s ‘market values’. Another way was to 
value the property as if it were facing a forced realisation.5* This squarely 
acknowledged the liquidity problem. 
Melbourne municipal tax rates were based on some form of assessment 
every three years53, but judging from Mulhall's data these likely were inflated. 
And then there were market values. Most Melbourne real property sales were 
by auction, invariably promoters brought suburban allotments under the 
hammer. In the exhilarating days of the boom, auction houses organised 
50 Meudell, The Pleasant Career of a Spendthrift 256. 
51 Table Talk. 30 September 1892. 
This Was practiced in Ontario as a means of arriving at assessments for municipal taxation, 
r• recommended by directors of the Freehold Assets Company in 1908. ANU, 
12/1, David Fell and Company, Directors’ Minute Books, 20 August 1908. 
53 Table Talk. 19 February 1892. 
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Saturday sales with a picnic atmosphere—free transportation and liquid 
refreshments—to loosen onlookers’ inhibitions. To move things along, 
‘puffers’ or ‘dummies’ pushed up the bidding.54 If these agents of the vendor or 
auctioneer placed the winning bid, then at least a reserve price had been made. 
This dodge would not put coins in the pocket—it cost the promoter auction fees, 
though auctioneers would reduce commissions55—but it might have fooled a 
lender into maintaining the vendor's overdraught coverage. It is difficult to 
believe, however, that colourful ploys made a big impact. Boom valuations 
could not have been inflated solely by liquor, puffing, sweetheart loans on 
inflated valuations, and false sales. Market valuations also originated in a 
structural feature of the land market. 
Shann had detected something when he noted the absence of a futures 
market. The inability to arrange land sales for a future transfer date precluded 
direct involvement by doomsayers or ‘bears’ in the market. Not only do these 
players in commodity markets introduce caution and convey countervailing 
information to the market, but they sell short to ‘bear’ a market, increasing the 
number of contracts currently available, easing pressure on supply. Victorian 
land markets in common with those elsewhere in capitalist communities_ 
could only accommodate ‘bulls’ who demanded land immediately to meet 
growth in the city, or the assumption of continued growth. A market 
comprised entirely of ‘bulls’ will seek as quickly as possible to exploit what they 
see as a favourable situation. Acting quickly in expectation of big profits, they 
will heavily discount the future; Urey will accept both a premium price and the 
prospect of a heavy debt burden spread over many years. They do not 
anticipate carrying that burden far into the future, rather they contemplate a 
Merri rucfMalcolm MclS^^My & C°'’ CorresPondencc 1882-9, IIS. 
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prompt and profitable exit. An 1896 royal commission on mortgage banking 
perceptively remarked that Victoria needed a ‘scientific method of loaning on 
land.’56 
What Victoria had acquired were preconditions for a land bubble. 
Alterations to cautious English banking practices had allowed a differential in 
interest rates that helped draw British investors to the colony and promoted a 
cavalier attitude toward land as collateral. Australians borrowed more abroad 
on mortgage security than other primary producing areas.5? Meanwhile, land 
valuation was biased toward unrealistic heights. Corporate evolution provided 
Melbourne with an array of competitive lending firms which, Silberberg 
submitted, increased die availability of mortgage funds and reduced their cost. 
The ‘easy money’ encouraged participants in the city-building process to 
produce new urban space.5* Booms are enthusiasms floated on an expanding 
volume of bank credit. A look at several types of investors can put substance 
into that generalisation. 
Participants 
The ease ol property transactions under the Torrens land registration 
system the important South Australian contribution to many land markets— 
and die relaxation of prudence in Victorian lending made for tangles of land 
deals whose permutations defy precis. An examination of the insolvency 
schedules of failed speculators discloses complicated dealings and mixed 
portfolios, but they offer only a ‘snapshot’ taken at die moment of insolvency. 
Still, diey show that many failed investors held allotments, terrace dwellings, 
,Yn'i?r'a’ ^P01? °f the Royal Commission on State Banking (Melbourne: Robert S. Brain, 
1895), v. 
J.D. Bailey, Australian Borrowing in Scotland in the Nineteenth Century’, Economic 
History Review, second series, vol.12 (December, 1959), 268-79. 
CO 
(Se t 977)e ^an<^ Boom’, Australian Economic History Review. 17 
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stocks in land companies or utilities, and belonged to land investment 
syndicates. ‘New companies’, recalled Turner, ‘were floated every week to 
give those who were too timid to speculate themselves an opportunity of sharing 
in die profitable speculations of the directors....There was no comer in the wide 
domain of finance that was not occupied by these companies.’59 Investors with 
their involved holdings owed calls on capital to syndicates and were indebted to 
other individuals, banks, mortgage banks, and building societies. The latter are 
a good place to begin a discussion of participants. Melbourne had plenty; 34 in 
1880 and 62 in the city and suburbs by 1888.60 Histories of two—though they 
may be atypical—intimate how they participated in a building cycle. 
Established in 1871, the Modem and Permanent Building Society (MPBS) 
boasted a name faithfully depicting evolution within finance capitalism. It was 
permanent and modem. Traditional building societies, originating out of 
mutual benefit associations, served a limited number of subscribers, demanded 
firm security, and terminated by plan after many subscribers had been enabled 
to buy a house.61 A later innovation, permanent societies functioned as on¬ 
going concerns.62 Gradually, the MPBS abolished die practices of mutual 
benefit societies. For example, in old societies, members bid against one 
another for access to die accumulated capital. They bid discount rates, 
effectively creating a variable rate of interest. In 1873, the MPBS altered its 
59 Turner, A History of the Colony of Victoria 262-3. 
60 Silberberg, ‘Institutional Investors in the Real Estate Mortgage Market’, 166. 
61E J; ®eay- -^T Bu!!ding Society Movement (London: Elek Books 19661- Bmlin 
Investment in Australian Economic Development 254-5 * '* ’ 
621 Jlnf a*™ bl”,lding S^iedes f,rst aPPeared in the Melbourne region in the mid- 
The BrightoiSSnSSS T™ ‘hey peFm“entand businesslike, 
have lent to several parties often suggesting it was a terminating society, but it seems to 
Royal Historical SocSof vfemria^ox ll ’ Hn S^Culative builders. See 
Books, 8 March, 2 May 5 September, 19 SeptemKr 1854'°" d,"g SoC‘e,y Minute 
rules so that it could set tables of fixed rates of interest Four years later, the 
MPBS eliminated another relic by accepting applications for loans without 
charging membership fees.<* its directors wished to accommodate a lucrative 
money selling business. Another modem aspect was that the MPBS did not just 
rely on the savings of participants, something which had been permitted in 
Victoria since 1864 « It took in investment capital and borrowed from banks 
and from other building societies. 
Within a year from its start in 1871, if not from the beginning, the MPBS 
lent to builders who erected homes in anticipation of eventual sales.66 By 1880, 
it was even building a few shops and houses, acting as a speculative builder on 
its own account.67 Based on an analysis of loan applications, Noel Butlin 
concluded that the MPBS ‘came increasingly to deal with speculative builders, 
first in the form of small contractors [in the early 1880s],..and then, 
increasingly with large-scale contracting firms.’61* In 1884, it commenced 
property development in the city core, paying the highest frontage costs 
recorded for the city. ‘Modem Chambers’, the building it erected on the costly 
Coilrns Street site, included a ‘Property Auction Mart’.611 At the seat of the 
MPBS, an aggressive institution, the practices and instruments of modem 
property sales were visibly in place. Moreover, the MPBS indirectly and 
directly added to the supply of urban space and it forwarded the sale of such 
space in a setting that stimulated a ‘bull’ market. 
63 ANU, 24/1/1, MPBS, Minute Books, 12 September 1872; 28 February 1873. 
64 ANU, 24/1/2, MPBS, Minute Books, 6 September 1877. 
66 Victoria, Report of the Select Committee 69. 
66 ANU, 24/1/1, MPBS, Minute Books, entries for February 1872. 
67 ANU, 24/1/2, MPBS, 9 December 1880; 13 October 1881. 
6® Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 260. 
69 ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, 5 June 1884; 27 January 1888. 
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In 1876-79, the MPBS had passed through an earlier crisis, foreclosing on 
many debtors, liquidating some properties, and reducing the interest paid on 
deposits, an action it coordinated with several other societies.70 Business raced 
ahead from 1880 to 1888. Few mortgagors fell into arrears. Seventy per cent 
of loans between 1881 and 1891 were made on the security of residential 
property; the focus shifted from inner city suburbs to new suburbs, especially 
after 1885.71 Understandably, the company's valuator complained in 1887 
about being overworked as the MPBS sifted through applications for loans 
totalling from £5000 to £10,000 weekly.72 One wonders about his diligence. 
The land boom diluted managerial talent in other ways, for the expansion in 
scale and number of lending institutions skimmed off experienced personnnel 
from many institutions.73 Although it is not clear what percentage of the 
valuation the MPBS would advance, a smaller and more prudent society lent 
between sixty and seventy percent of valuation.74 Regardless of the standard 
practice, the boom entailed carelessness. 
To accommodate brisk demand for loans to cover the purchases of urban 
space, the firm courted British investors early in 1886.75 It returned to this 
well often, finding depositors and buyers for its debentures, notably in 
Scotland.76 There was a feeling among the societies in late 1887 that the local 
70 ANU, 24/1/1, MPBS Minute Books, 25 July 1876; 1 November 1877; 24/1/2, Minute 
Books, 25 July 1878, 17 January 1878; 23 January 1879; 12 June 1879; 16 October 1879. 
71 Silberberg, Instititutional Investors in the Real Estate Mortgage Market’, 174 and 180. 
72 ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, Minute Books, 29 September 1887. 
73 N“nn, fidget Documents pf the Nineteenth Centurv: A Two Vol.. c.rir. 
Vol.2 (Melbourne: National Australia Bank, 1988), 193. -M W penes, 
A 
University of Melbourne Archives (henceforth UMA} StinrbrH r> 
Society (henceforth SMBS), Minute Books, 2 SeptemterTs^ Bu,ldlng 
75 ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, 11 Febniary 1886; 25 November 1886. 
!rii ~rr8 ihe,r vauks for ,hem' beca“se ,he had p°ac|,e< Uie banks tuff. However, banks routinely covered rhe MPBS's 
overdraughts which starred escalate ou, of centre, in early ,889 - By then 
Zhad S'“ned: "“*-** - - speculative builders 
defaulted, for their difficulties had tregun months earlier ,md now they passed 
= consequences along to the MPBS. Interconnections rnshed into during ,he 
es a e oom had produced a house of cards, for the MBPS had deposits will 
,8912TTT1 r!T lha‘ We'e ta lr0,,ble When 'vord ^ i" Novembe, 
Ja, die C„y of Melbourne Building Society had suspended business, die 
removed „s account from die Commercial Bank where bod, had done 
business.^ The integration of financial services pointed ou, by Silberberg 
might have spread risk, had no, so many individuals and institutions been 
involved m speculalion. Now, integration propagated panic. 
For die next two years, the MPBS subsisted by juggling securities in order 
to obtain bank loans. The dealings with die Bank of Australasia in ,„|y and 
September 1892 are suggestive. In July the bank advanced £20.000 on £60 000 
security.79 The margin of security was high, bu, i, consisted of deeds that the 
MPBS held as security for loans that i, had made. The security, therefore, was 
unregistered mortgages. Moreover, die deeds stayed m the possession of the 
MPBS's solicitor. An inverted pyramid of credit rested on these deeds and the 
budding society tried to relain control of them. In September, the bank offered 
£100,000 on £500.000 security. This time i, insisted on die transfer of deeds.'9 
The proposal captured a remarkable fall in the worth of real property as 
in Scotland in Ih^Ninereenlh Cemu^^^?^31*3 ** , D‘ BaiIey' 'Austratian Bonowing 
ANU, 24/1/3. MPBS, Minute Books, see entries for Januaiy 1889. 
^ ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, 30 November 1891. 
ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, Minute Books, 28 July 1892. 
80 ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, 22 September 1892. 
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security. During the boom, lenders had advanced up to 70 per cent, now one 
which could still accept a risk granted merely 20 per cent of valuation. 
Further difficulties at the MPBS illustrate what a liquidity crisis meant. 
Since late 1889, this society had been taking possession of mortgagors' 
properties. In September 1891, it realised it had accumulated a monumental 
problem, amounting to perhaps 1000 houses. To hold tenants, it had to cut rents 
and make repairs. An agent was hired to inspect and supervise properties.81 
Directors hoped that some dwellings could be sold, but more houses were 
acquired by foreclosure. The society's housing stock grew to nearly 1200 units 
in 1895 (Figure 1). As its store of dwellings increased, the MPBS felt a pinch. 
It had accumulated properties that could not generate enough revenue to pay 
depositors who, from panic or need, were pulling out their money. The 
predicament was symptomatic of a failure to recognise the liquidity problem; 
institutional lenders had clutched at short term deposits while making longer- 
term loans which were backed by collateral that could not be sold in an 
I emergency. 
With diminished mortgage-payment revenue, a troublesome and unwanted 
: rental business, and assets that could not be liquidated, the MPBS had to default 
! on obligations. In May 1893, it persuaded creditors (depositors) to accept 
: deposit receipts in lieu of cash and investors to take longer-term debentures. 
Many other institutions survived by adopting the same expedients, including 
five banks of issue during April and May 1893.82 For almost the next ten years, 
the MPBS functioned like an assets realisation company. It ceased making 
loans; in June 1893 it discontinued its practice of remaining open on pay nights 
for the convenience of depositors and borrowers.8? In common with assets 
ANU, 24/1/3, MPBS, 24/1/3, Minute Books, 17 September 1891. 
Boehm, Prosperity and Depression 300. 
ANU, 24/1/4, MPBS, Minute Books, 13 June 1895. 
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— 
: realisation companies that toiled in the rubble of insolvency, it struggled to 
j dispose of urban space. It found no market from 1893 to 1897. Not one MPBS 
i property was sold at an auction in January 1896.84 After this failed test of the 
l market, it contacted 84 real estate agents and asked them to submit tenders 
indicating the districts where they would like to collect rents for the MPBS and 
how much commission they would charge.85 The agents were also to try to sell 
the houses. Real success began on this front in 1900 (Figure 1). Only in 1907, 
could the MPBS dispense with the services of the carpenter who had repaired 
it's houses.86 
A similar pattern of events plagued the smaller and less aggressive Standard 
I Mutual Building Society (SMBS). Unlike the MPBS, this society had averted 
I direct participation in speculation, although it lent to builders, estate agents, and 
i landlords.87 During die boom, its weekly business amounted to half that of the 
| MPBS. Like die MPBS, the SMBS first experienced a slow down in 1889, 
though loan approvals increased again in 1890 (Figure 2). Concurrent with the 
approvals, however, the SMBS had started to foreclose. Some 1890 
foreclosures were against landlords who had held title to terrace units in 
working class suburbs. Those who first detected die over-built condition of the 
city had been building contractors, now landlords who let units to distressed 
labourers experienced a crisis. 
Foreclosures had been rare prior to 1890. Their novelty was not only a 
consequence of prior good times, radier building societies were always 
reluctant to take over properties because they were not set up as property 
management concerns. So reluctant was die SMBS that, while it foreclosed on 
841896U’ 24/1/4> MPBS’ MinUtC B°°kS’ 22 °Ct0ber 1895; 31 October 1895; 30 January 
85 ANU, 24/1/4, MPBS, Minute Books, 23 April; 7 May 1896. 
8(> ANU, 24/1/5, MPBS, Minute Books, 16 May 1906. 
87 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 5 December 1891, unidentified clipping. 
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properties, it also accepted some mortgagors' requests for easier terms rather 
than carry the charges of managing rental dwellings. Nevertheless, by 1894, 
the SMBS held approximately 400 houses.88 A.E. Dingle and D.T. Merrett 
found that, a few years after the crash, building societies became the city's 
largest landlords holding 7.5 to 10.5 per cent of its housing stock.89 
The surplus of urban space became obvious to the directors of the SMBS by 
the summer of 1890. In August, they rejected a loan application ‘on account of 
the number of empty houses in the neighbourhood.’ By early 1891, the 
difficulties of the surplus manifested itself in another way. As the number of 
foreclosed properties multiplied, the SMBS—like die MPBS—had to deal 
routinely with tenants who could negotiate for lower rents due to abundant 
vacant houses.90 In September 1891, a fresh predicament arose when many 
investors stopped renewing deposits.91 To cover withdrawals and expenses, die 
society sought loans from the Bank of Victoria and an insurance company.92 
Like many counterparts, the SMBS stumbled along with short-term bank 
support until squeezed into a reorganisation. In December 1892, it appealed to 
depositors to accept debentures. What may have secured their compliance was a 
threat of voluntary insolvency entailing a liquidation of assets that advocates of 
reorganisation claimed would take ten to twelve years.93 In fact, liquidation of 
Sill™—aSSSSHsx 
90 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 18 February 1892; 24 November 1892. 
91 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 7 October 1891; 2 December 1891; 20 January 1892. 
9^ UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 8 July 1892. 
93 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, Minute Book 
in this volume. 1885-1892, unidentified clipping pressed 
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foreclosed properties by the restructured society took almost as long. The 
SMBS found it nearly impossible to sell property from 1891 to 1898. In the 
spring of 1891, it discovered it could not sell foreclosed houses.94 Dingle and 
Merrett place the beginning of city-wide recovery of real estate sales in 1897.95 
That would have been early for this society, but the chairman of the board 
enthused in August 1900 that ‘we have at length entered the floodtide of 
prosperity.’96 
In the moribund market of the mid-1890s, a few mortgagors walked away 
from their houses, handing in keys to the society. Home buyers had seen their 
equity in a mortgaged property erased by the price collapse. Now, some 
calculated, it was cheaper to live in rental housing than to sustain payments to a 
building society.97 Offering better terms, the SMBS pleaded with them to stay 
put, but in the exodus from the city and inner suburbs were a number of SMBS 
clients. The population of greater Melbourne declined from 490,900 in 1891 to 
477,500 in 1896. Perversely, inventories of a very durable commodity grew 
after production ceased. Like the MPBS, the SMBS of necessity emerged as a 
novice landlord in a tenants' market. 
To attract and retain tenants, it had to repair units which had deteriorated in 
the hands of the hard-pressed previous owners. But not even reduced rent and 
improvements helped in certain cases, such as the one where ‘the agent advises 
that it will be difficult to let at a nominal rent.’98 In desperation, the SMBS 
94 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 22 April 1891. 
95 A.E. Dingle and D.T. Merrett, ‘Landlords in Suburban Melbourne, 1891-1911’, 
Australian Economic History Review. 23. 
96 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 8 August 1900. 
97 UMA, SMBS, 12 October 1894; 7 November 1894. Mortgage lending was sometimes 
thought of as ‘pawnbroking’, because they had the similar risk that the borrower, not facing 
insolvency by surrendering the security, was certain to forfeit this security the moment it 
became unsaleable. See Table Talk. 3 February 1893. 
98 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 20 March 1895. 
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leased several miserable properties to a landlord who paid a flat rate." A rent 
collector was hired in 1892, but the results were so poor he was let go in 1896 
for want of work.100 Apart from the lost revenue, vacancy meant vandalism 
and squatters.101 Only in 1898 could the society unload its houses and by 1899 it 
could also pick and choose tenants, turning down business from slum 
landlords!102 
Contemporary witnesses lacked theoretical understanding, but they 
occasionally made telling observations. Henry Gyles Turner, for example, 
suggested that quite as much money was lost in private land syndicates as by 
banks and building societies.103 Although he cited no evidence, his proximity to 
the action and Melbourne’s insolvency schedules add syndicates to the list of 
important participants in the land boom. A description of how an 
unincorporated land syndicate worked exposes the investor's jeopardy. Their 
creators may have used them to offset risk for the land dealings they initiated. 
By 1888, new land syndicates had an air of desperation about them as their 
authors attempted to slip a heavy obligation.104 Turner recalled that the 
syndicates had burgeoned in 1886-87. Having purchased a large tract of land 
with credit, typically a farm on the suburban fringe, the promoter or promoters 
canvassed for others to join in. Often this was done through newspaper 
advertisements or a circular, though land agents and auctioneers were 
sometimes solicited for die names of individuals who appeared interested in 
99 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 18 January 1893. 
100 UMA, SMBS, Minute Books, 18 September 1896. 
ANU, 24/1/4, MPBS, Minute Books, 27 February 1896. 
102 UMA, SMBS, 26 April 1899. 
103 Turner- A History of the Colony of Victoria 303. 
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speculation.105 Past profits, of the order discovered by Silberberg, were surely 
the bait. Possibly some investors were novices, but many joined several 
syndicates 
Syndicates differed. Many concentrated on a single suburb, but one 
syndicate held land in Glen Iris, Campbellfield, Hastings, Fern Tree Gully, and 
Northcote.107 Others also had scattered holdings because, when a single 
syndicate lacked the resources to buy and subdivide a large estate, the vendor s 
agent would approach several syndicates.10* * Syndicate membership seems to 
have been small, consisting of 5 to 20 investors109; the corollary of this was that 
each member had to pledge a large sum. Investors included the affluent and 
influential: merchants, manufacturers, solicitors, building-materials suppliers, 
pastoralists, sharebrokers, and politicians. Some investors belonged to several 
syndicates, borrowing money for the initial instalments for each. The risk to 
the economy was that operators of otherwise viable concerns could go bankrupt 
on account of land dealings. Investors pledged to pay the balance owing on 
their pledges at calls , that is by instalments spread over three to Five years. 
Some investors assumed that they would sell enough land to cover the calls and, 
of course, rake in a profit. The prospect that the calls might become a burden 
was not a prominent calculation. If, as turned out to be the case, sales faltered, 
105 La Trobe Library, Ms 9342, Yeo, Crossthwaite & Co., Yeo, Bretnall, and Merrin to 
Malcolm McLean, 5 October 1888; 25 June 1889. 
* 10^ This is apparent in the lists of liabilities cited by insolvents in their insolvency schedules, 
discussed later in the paper. 
107 Victorian Public Record Office, Victorian Public Record Series (henceforth VPRS), 765, 
unit 5, Melbourne Insolvency Court, 1891-3, Schedule of Alfred Strongman. 
108 La Trobe Library, Ms 9342, Yoe, Crossthwaite & Co., H. Merrins to Malcolm McLean, 
11 October 1888. 
109 La I robe Library, Ms 9342, Yoe, Crossthwaite & Co., Correspondence, 1882-9, Yeo 
Bretnall Merrin to G. Pallett, 25 June 1889. Land held by the McKinnon Heights Syndicate 
had not sold an auction in January and the members were being called upon for capital. 
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then the syndicate officers demanded calls, enforcing these with threats about 
die investors' loss of equity or widi writs if necessary.110 
As a leveraged investment, a syndicate involved the risk of a headlong fall 
into an abyss of debt. Or as Turner put it, ‘the depressing cloud of uncalled 
capital hung suspended like the fiat of doom.’ He estimated the liabilities for 
calls—from companies as well as syndicates—in 1891-93 as exceeding 
£10,000,000.’11 Confidence in die economy was shaken in 1892 when lists of 
bank shareholders were published, for die investing and saving public could 
‘judge what the asset of uncalled capital may be worth.’112 This consideration 
raises, once more, a question about Hall's thesis diat a government declaration 
making banknotes legal tender in March 1893 could have rescued a sound 
economy. A day of reckoning, of some sort, was unavoidable. 
In dieir 1967 review of The Land Boomers, Beever and Freeman 
mentioned that the re-building of Melbourne's commercial core contributed to 
the boom, that not all of the feverish activity occurred in the suburbs. Some of 
the over-building involved the rebuilding of the central business district. The 
case of City Properties furnishes an example of core redevelopment in boom 
and bust. City Properties concentrated on central commercial properties. Its 
most famous undertaking was die elegant arcade known as ‘The Block’. 
Incorporated with broad powers to buy and sell land, lend on mortgages, and 
build all manner of structures, it commenced operations in 1886.113 Benjamin 
Fink, Meudell's former employer and the most expansive landboomer in the 
city, was a founder. Within months of formation, the slow down in suburban 
1 n L? L!brary. Ms 9342, Yoe, Crossthwaite & Co., Correspondence 188? 0 v™ 
111 
Turner’ A.History of the Colony of VinnHr, Vol.2, 306. 
112 Table Talk, 11 March 1892. 
"3 UMA, Howd.n and Lyell. Ci.y Property Bo, I, Memorandum of Associarion. 
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land sales had begun, so City Properties, which had started with central business 
buildings, confined its operations to the commercial core. Locked into 
developing ‘The Block’ even as they felt a tightening of credit in 1889, directors 
sought capital by issuing ‘calls’ upon shareholders. Some could not comply. 
They also sought to borrow to 60 per cent of the valuation of some of their 
properties.114 They determined to complete ‘The Block’. 
City Properties tenants included retailers, commercial services, and 
professionals, all of whom likely felt the initial contraction of trade in 1888 and 
1889. These tenants had staying power and a belief in improvement. That hope 
may have been a desperate one, but it caused them to struggle on—as the 
building societies had—by means of credit. As tenants in a high rent district 
their reputations and business accounts secured for them credit even while 
banks generally contracted loans. A few tenants proposed expansion in 1889—90 
and new ones came forward to book space in ‘The Block’."5 While several 
tenants asked for reduced rents as early as May 1889, the directors held the line 
until March 1892; thereafter, they granted concessions.116 By that time some 
major tenants were in arrears and destined for insolvency. In the summer of 
1893, City Properties began to turn over its rents directly to mortgagees, 
eventually losing control of all but ‘The Block’ (Figure 3). 
Thus far, this sketch of participants has dealt with institutions or syndicates. 
The abundant wheeling and dealing by individuals is more difficult to 
summarise and the one rich source besides land registry records—the 
Melbourne insolvency court—by definition only collected information on 
failures. Yet, the schedules and declarations filed with the court offer glimpses 
of individuals' assets and liabilities in the boom and bust. They substantiate the 
114 UMA, City Properties, Minute Books, 13 June 1889; 25 June 1889. 
115 UMA, City Properties, Minute Books, 11 December 1889; 14 January, 25 April, 5 June, 
27 October 1890. 
116 UMA, City Properties, Minute Books, 27 May 1889; 16 March, 15 June, 27 July 1892; 
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claim by Beever and Freeman that Cannon had created a spurious impression of 
corruption as the hallmark of the land boomers. 
hi order to extract good value from court records, it is necessary to 
summarise Victorian insolvency law. Nuances aside, there were three 
categories of personal insolvency and the numbers in each suggest things about 
the state of the economy. The most common were voluntary insolvencies. 
Individuals filing with the court under this heading declared an inability to meet 
liabilities. In good times and bad, a certain number of small individually- 
operated businesses failed and their operators elected to declare themselves 
insolvent so as to limit repayments to seven shillings in the pound, retain a 
certain amount of personal goods and tools, and eventually secure a court 
discharge to start anew. These insolvencies did not rise remarkably during the 
crash (Figure 4).117 Compulsory insolvencies occurred when a creditor sensed 
that someone could no longer meet outstanding accounts or loans and had to be 
taken out of business before assets dwindled further, leaving barebones for 
creditors. Often a creditor was hard pressed too and could not grant an 
extension. A sharp rise in compulsory insolvencies signalled panic and collapse 
(Figure 5). It would appear from the number of these that the Melbourne 
economy was in difficulty before the actual bank crisis which Hall accepted as a 
turning point.118 
Until 1896, it was possible in Victoria to reach an out of court settlement 
with one s creditors, always for a repayment schedule of much less than the 
Xrns“eS a‘ 'he Cnd °f CaCh year’ but they dW no. provide a ullly for 
54 Victoria No.l 102. Insolvency Act (1890). 
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minimum of seven shiilings in the pound mandated by law when insolvency 
cases went to court."9 Clearly, a composition—a ‘compote’—was of no interest 
to creditors unless the debtor had leverage. A few compositions were made 
between friends and relatives. The more prevalent and potent leverage was 
secrecy; the court clerk registered the agreements but no evidence had to be 
heard in court. As the economy slipped from bad to worse, insecure 
creditors—for example deposit institutions—did not wish to have their bad 
investments bruited about. It was worth the price of a minuscule recovery on 
loans to preserve public confidence. Large debtors had a power of blackmail. 
It is no wonder that banker Turner, who surely recalled secret ‘compotes’ with 
bitterness, felt that the failure of gentlemen to abide by contracts had 
precipitated bank failures. While compositions, like compulsory insolvencies, 
intimated a recessionary collapse, they emphatically declared a particularly 
dark phase. Not only were compositions a portent that towering business 
figures had lost enormous sums, but they conceivably illustrate the frailty of 
financial institutions just before they suspended operations or while seeking to 
reorganise. They appeared suddenly in 1891 and shot up in 1892 (Figure 5). 
It is helpful to think of insolvents as falling into three groups of land market 
participants, each with a different capacity to sense the over-supply of urban 
space, each with distinctive survival capabilities. The first group, the lower end 
producers and sellers included real estate agents, residential landlords, and 
small building contractors with slender resources and restricted credit. These 
people may have speculated, gambling on future demand, but they necessarily 
worked closely with immediate demand for urban space. They are represented 
by many small-scale property-industry operators who became insolvent in 
increasing numbers around 1886. A slowing of demand struck them first. That 
No. 1513. Insolvency Act 
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was the experience with J.R. Buxton a South Melbourne realtor whose sales 
peaked in 1885 (Figure 6).120 Possibly, as this sketchy evidence suggests, the 
land market was becoming over-supplied, in terms of immediately required 
urban space, as early as 1885-86. The timing squares with a 1892 report by 
Table Talk that seven years earlier it had warned that more allotments had been 
cut up ‘than would be sufficient to house the whole population of London.’121 
The second group—the facilitators—included building supply firms and the 
financial institutions most directly involved with mortgage lending. 'Hie 
evidence suggests that facilitators initially became aware of over-supply 
problems in 1888-89, as demands by lower end producers and sellers faltered. 
Finally, there were the major players: big speculators, developers of large 
commercial ventures, and primary financiers. What distinguished them was 
their involvement in additional businesses and deep pockets—their own and 
those of others. They had strategies to survive the initial shock of over-supply, 
but when they could hold out no longer they filed for insolvency or ‘composed’ 
in 1892-93. Cannon's narrative dealt with the machinations of a handful of 
them. 
To better understand who the large as well as more modest speculators 
were, two samples were selected from the 1892 insolvency records. One 
sample consisted of all voluntary and compulsory insolvents who had debts of 
more than £10,000.»22 These 41 parties—7 per cent of all voluntary and 
compulsory insolvents—accounted for eighteen per cent of all insolvents’ 
indebtedness, including compositions. They had a mean debt of about £35,000 
12189M9jf i9ia‘°n Pty’ Ud' PapCrS’ RCal Es‘ate Ledgers’ 1871-1880, 1883-4, 1887- 
121 Table Talk. 16 September 1892. 
records arc rhe form of 
bundle usually contained the petition for incr»n ^ SC ° j?e lnsolvent. The records in the 
On seveod occasions. Coy remained ,0c insolveSditatoSnmi^^T' 
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or £23,000 if two enormous insolvencies are excluded. The second sample 
consisted of insolvents who composed their debts and whose assets—surely 
overvalued—still left a deficiency of more than £10,000.123 The thirty-nine 
debtors meeting this condition had a mean deficiency of roughly £67,000. By 
setting high thresholds, it was hoped that most would be parties who played the 
land market heavily. This proved to be the case. 
Of the forty one ‘regular’ insolvents, thirty attributed their plight to 
depreciation in value of my real estate and inability to realise on same.’ 
Sometimes petitioners added information about illness or the stagnation of trade 
to this stock phrase. Several mentioned ‘the absolute failure of any market for 
real estate and stocks’; several blamed the pressure of ‘calls’ for payment on 
land syndicate shares. One described conditions like those besetting the 
building societies. He could sell no real estate and he suffered a ‘loss of rent 
through inability to obtain tenants.’ Who were the thirty large-scale land- 
speculator insolvents? Were they dishonest? 
A dozen occupations were covered, including widow, gentleman, clerk, 
leather merchant, gardener, builder, merchant's salesman, hotel keeper, and 
several each of estate agents, auctioneers, accountants, and solicitors. Only one 
of these insolvents surfaces in The Land Boomers as a convicted crook: Patrick 
Cleary, the accountant who helped Matthias Larkin defraud die South 
Melbourne Building Society. Two others had committed improper acts: 
auctioneer and valuer Robert Curtain and solicitor James Wighton received 
sweetheart’ loans from linancial institutions diey served. However, the thirty 
also included J.R. Buxton’s partner, William Buckhurst, who convinced the 
liquidators of die South Melbourne Building Society to finance the further 
prosecution of Larkin. What diese thirty shared were purchases of land or land 
123 vprs 763, Boxes 4-12, Melbourne Insolvency Court, Deeds of Composition. 
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syndicate shares late in the boom followed by a bitter understanding of the 
liquidity hazard. 
The thirty-nine who composed debts and had deficiencies between liabilities 
and assets of more than £10,000 were slightly different from large voluntary 
and compulsory insolvents. Those who composed debts had a mean deficiency 
of £67,000, or £41,000 if tire million pound deficiency of Benjamin Fink is 
excluded. The thirty-nine accounted for seven per cent of all insolvents, but 
one third of the value. Among their number were auctioneers and solicitors, 
but also a number from higher status occupations: gentlemen, landowners, 
architects, a manufacturer, brewer, and grazier. At least one faced criminal 
charges.124 Only three were uninvolved with land markets and a fourth was a 
grazier who went into debt to buy freehold land for his station. Clearly, most 
insolvents who composed debts were heavily involved in land speculation. 
Altogether, the sixty-six land speculators among the two samples of insolvents 
accounted for roughly forty per cent of the debts of Melbourne’s insolvents in 
1892. In their haste to reap profits on the order of those found by Silberberg, 
investors lost sight of the risks. They assumed liquidity for urban space. Since 
many operated other businesses, their costly errors impaired other areas of the 
city's economy. Land speculation was not hived off from ‘healthy’ realms of 
enterprise. In that sense, the collapse was surely connected to the excesses of the 
boom. 
The Liquidation of Real Property 
The SMBS and the MPBS suiwived the crash, but had to liquidate collateral. 
Many financial institutions went straight into liquidation. Liquidators had a 
flourishing trade handling the assets of individuals who filed for insolvency. In 
the public areas around Judge Hickman Molcsworth’s insolvency court, so- 
124 Cannon, The Land Boomers, 175. 
called ‘trade assignees’ buttonholed insolvents and solicitors as they arrived.125 
The liquidation business is one area of the crash that has not been studied. 
Preliminary insights can be extracted from the records for five companies 
that had to wind up their business. They offer impressions of the real property 
market in collapse and of problems with suburban land investments. Three of 
the failed companies—the City of Melbourne Bank (Melbourne), the Federal 
Bank and the Mercantile Bank—were among the twelve ‘real banks’ with 
headquarters in Melbourne at the start of the bust. Such banks were intended 
primarily to discount commercial paper and issue bank notes. However, these 
three, like building societies and mortgage banks, lent extensively on landed 
security (Figure 7). Further, the Federal and City of Melbourne belonged to a 
cooperative organisation of banks of issue, the Associated Banks.126 
As the weakest and smallest of the Associated Banks, the Federal was the 
first to suspend—28 January 1893.127 It never reopened. The more substantial 
Melbourne suspended on 17 May 1893, opened on 19 June, and failed in August 
1895.128 The Mercantile had suspended on 5 March 1892 as a prelude to 
liquidation.129 The two other firms, land mortgage banks, had been formed 
purely to speculate in land: the Freehold Investment and Banking Company 
(Freehold), and the English and Australian Mortgage Bank (E&A). They were 
among the largest of the companies that bought vacant suburban land for resale 
125 vprs 76, unit 3, Insolvency Court Correspondence, 1888-1898, Clerk of the 
Insolvency Court, 13 July 1896, draft reply to a report in the Herald dated 9 July 1896. 
*26 Boehm, Prosperity and Depression. 242-3. 
*27 The assets disposal firm that took over this bank reported debts outstanding in 1897 at 
£303,357; assets in 1899 were valued at £188,827. ANU, 12/36, Fell Co., The Federal 
Assets Co. Ltd., Register of Assets. 
*28 The assets disposal firm that took over from this bank reported debts outstanding in 1897 
at £2,929,775. It’s assets were valued at £615,838 n 1899. ANU, 12/35, Fell Co., 
Melbourne Assets Co. Ltd., Register of Assets. 
129 The assets disposal firm that took over from this bank reported outstanding debts of 
£606,067. Its assets were valued at £212,387 in 1899. ANU, 12/35, Fell Co., The 
Mercantile Bank Assets Co. Ltd., Register of Assets. 
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in allotments and provided purchase-money mortgages.130 The E&A had at 
least a dozen subdivision surveys on the market when it collapsed on 4 February 
1893.131 The Freehold had preceded it on 30 January. All five had facilitated 
the dealings of the city’s major networks of land speculators.132 These ‘rotten’ 
lenders were not typical. An 1897 assessment of the status of the loans 
outstanding at all four realisation companies showed that fifty-five per cent 
were considered wholly dead and merely one per cent had paid or were paying 
the contracted sums. Recovery of amounts outstanding, therefore, was a matter 
of realising sums from liquidation.133 
From their glory days when they had built or leased prominent offices, 
these institutions plummeted far and fast. The assets disposal firms that 
superseded the Melbourne, the Federal, the E&A, and the Mercantile shared 
space to save on overhead. The first three merged in 1903 and the Mercantile 
joined in 1910.134 The assets registers of these four indicate differences in the 
securities they had accepted, but they also underscore the prominence of land 
^ Silberberg, ‘Institutional Investors in the Real Estate Mortgage Market’, 166; 169. 
*31 ANU, 12/38, Fell Co., The English and Australian Assets Co. Ltd., ledger of assets. The 
twelve were Bowen Hill, Box Hill Land Development, Caulfeld Hill Estate, Cotham Estate, 
Devonshire Park, Fairfield Park, Gascoigne Estate, Hope Estate, Kooyong Park, Park 
View Estate, Rosebury Park, Warrington Estate. 
132 The manager ot The City of Melbourne Bank, Colin Langmuir, financed his own land 
investments and those of Benjamin Fink and David Munro with this bank’s credit. The 
Federal Bank financed the dealings of members of the Baillieu and Munro families. 
Matthew Davies and his friends and relatives used Davies' bank, the Mercantile Bank for 
their speculations. The English and Australian as well as the Freehold were also part of the 
Davies' network of land and finance companies. Cannon, The Land Boomers. 34, 104-5, 
139-41, 165-77; Boehm, Prosperity and Depression. 256n. Historical sketches of these 
banks appeared in Table Talk. 11 March 1892; 13 January 1893; 19 May 1893; 18 May 
1894. 
*33 This was based on the sample of assets taken from the ledgers. 
134 UMA, R.II. Butler Papers, Melbourne Trust Limited, Memorandum of Association of 
Melbourne Trust Limited, 13 July 1903; Mercantile Bank Assets Company Ltd., Directors 
Report, 1909. 
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speculator accounts.135 The three banks had somewhat similar portfolios, 
while the E&A clearly had tied up substantial assets in rural properties— 
presumably for conversion to suburban allotments (Figure 7). 'Hie four had the 
vast majority of their assets in Melbourne, its suburbs, and neighbouring 
counties.136 The fifth institution, the Freehold, was liquidated as a separate 
concern and no ledgers were found. When taken together, only a small 
proportion of the securities of the four whose ledgers survive were in stocks, 
debentures, and pastoral lands. However, several very large advances from the 
Melbourne and Federal had been secured by pastoral estates; die Melbourne 
also had advanced money to a sugar plantation in Fiji (Figure 7). The 
downward revaluations of assets and the difficulty of recovering money by 
holding sales for such assets (Table 1) reaffirm die folly of Turner’s assertions 
about the safety of landed security and support Peels’ indictment. 
In the dismal circumstances of population loss and a depression in trade, 
values for urban space were greatly written down. How far had valuations 
dropped? The four companies which shared liquidation facilities found in 1897 
that realisable values on vacant urban land were less dian a tenth of book values 
(Table 1). When he addressed die 1896 select committee on die companies act, 
Col. John M. Templeton, president of the Fourth Victorian Permanent Building 
Society, could not venture an estimate on the current value of vacant land. 
There is so much of it.’ He thought allotments in his society's ‘paddock’ might 
have been worth an eighth the sums advanced.133 Meudell’s scathing remarks 
about valuators ‘false valuations and silly asses of auctioneers’138—resonate 
13theentries8are dated* ^ lhe aSSC’S of these flrms at ,he moment of their failure for 
^ve been 
137 Victoria, Report of the Select Commute 72. 
138 Meudell, Recollections of a Spendthrift 256. 
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with these reassessments. The values of the immediately unproductive remains 
of the boom and bust—the vacant urban tracts and allotments as well as the 
villas of the speculators—were most drastically marked down. In reference to 
suburban plots, liquidators time and again remarked ‘all valueless’139 or 
‘security of only nominal value’.140 A liquidator thought that land boomer 
James Munro's estate, serving then as a boarding house, ‘may possibly be some 
day used for a gentleman's country residence otherwise will have to be sold at 
great sacrifice. 141 Furthermore, liquidators recognised the importance of 
location and marked down certain suburban tracts more than others. One 
area on Albert Road in Camberwell142—was described as ‘perhaps the most 
disreputable quarter of the whole town-may have to be held for years before it 
can be advantageously used.’143 
Space managed as a going concern retained greater value (Table 1). 
Pastoral lands, sugar plantations and refineries, commercial properties, houses, 
and even vacant rural lands could generate income.144 Of course, it was not 
easy to secure or maintain tenants. Maintenance was a constant bother that an 
extreme case can illustrate memorably. Two weatherboard cottages of the 
139 
AIptdns'ton Land Co!' C°" T'’e E"8'iSh ^ Asset5 CoLtd- ledSer entry for 
140 ANU’ 12/34/1’ Fe" Co” ^ Federal Ass«s Co. Ltd., ledger entry- for Mrs. F.M. Flood. 
141 ANU, 12/36/1, Fell Co., The Mercantile Assets Co. Ltd., ledger entry for James Munro. 
14valIUes.may h3Ve bee" M°m Alben R°ad’ part of an that later had quite high real estate 
1 ^tuid Finance Cb!' Although !hXS SlW ^ for <*y Investment 
poor throughout the 1890s there was some est^te and construction remained 
suburbs. The street may aciual hav<S in several inner 
city could have experienced internal variations in sia^ri^’ V!’.,0 ProP°s>tion that the 
Capital Cities in the Nineteenth Century’ Australian8^0"’ SeeJ'W’ McCarty- ‘Australian 
rem^l^ on^theprofitabtlfw'onh'e st^on^t^nen''reCt0HS't,EeFOrtS f°r 1904"7’ 'ni«e 
Ftp. There were setbacks, but these propertiesrfte^hMprofnabk 5'“"°" ^ in 
E&A were ‘infested with white ants and...likely to become uninhabitable.’14* 
To extract minimal income, liquidators leased out suburban tracts for grazing 
and agriculture. The liquidator of the E&A did this with the allotments of the 
Footscray Land Company, and awaited the growth of the city.146 Also at 
Footscray, the Mercantile’s liquidator let 119 acres for grazing.147 With some 
justification, a pro-agrarian minority report of the 1895 royal commission on 
banking insisted that urban land ‘cannot be regarded as a security equal in safety 
to ordinary agricultural land.’14* However, this principle was not universally 
true. As with suburban allotments, liquidators discovered the importance of 
location, for some rural freehold estates were remote. Six hundred acres at 
Buln Buln were described as ‘in the heart of a Bush, a long way from any 
Railway, Main Road, or Settlement.’ However, by 1902, sales had recuperated 
the sum outstanding.14^ 
Most but not all people associated with land markets became more 
discriminating. During its hearings, the 1895 Royal Commission heard 
Turner. Unrevised, he insisted that land was like chattel property. ‘You have a 
certificate of title and can see at a glance that it is clean, and, therefore it greatly 
facilitates lending; it makes the land a profitable commodity. It must be a good 
thing for all the community that the people who own land can feel that they can 
realise if they want to.’150 His running together of problems of title—which 
^ ANTJ, 12/38/1, Fell Co., 3 he English and Australian Assets Co. Ltd., ledger entry for 
C.E. Jones. 
146 ANU, 12/38, David Fell and Co., Limited, English and Australian Co., Limited, Register 
of Assets, Division A, Real Estate. 
^4^ ANIJ, 12/36/1 Fell Co., The Mercantile Assets Co. Ltd., ledger entry for the Progressive 
Property Co. 6 J 6 
^ Report of the Royal Commission on State Banking, xx. 
149 ANU, 12/36/1, Fell Co., Mercantile Assets Co. Ltd., ledger entry for Miller Bros. Co. 
150 Rgport of the Royal Commission on State Banking. 386. 
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were being solved by Torrens title—with those of liquidity—which had not 
been solved—was sorted out by hard questioning which forced Turner to admit 
he was wrong about liquidity. 
Assets disposal firms and reconstructed financial institutions encountered 
the liquidity problem for at least a decade. There were no easy sales. In South 
Australia, Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria, there had been 
desperate talk of organising lotteries with real estate prizes, but this expedient, 
used after several earlier American land busts and to dispose of certain assets of 
the Bank of Australia in 1849, was now rejected by colonial governments 
sensitive to temperance and anti-gambling crusaders.151 Early in 1892, a huge 
assets realisation firm was proposed with some vague idea that it could both 
dispose of land and control the price by ‘cornering’ die market. The scheme 
died.152 Auction sales remained moribund for a decade. If the experience of 
the Freehold Assets Company is any example, the sale of land posed a 
dilemma.153 In addition to liquidating assets, the Freehold's directors believed 
they had to support a floor for real property prices—usually land—when 
almost no market existed. They routinely rebuffed first offers from bargain 
hunters, handing the manager exacting instructions: reject low offers but do not 
lose sales. Even for small parcels, this meant protracted negotiations.154 
151 State Library of Victoria, Banking in Australia from a London Official's Point of ViPU, 
M°nSiSe fndfin^ Companies (London: Blades, East and 
slant ’ 1883)\A3' Cannon, The Land Boomers, 198. Table Talk. 9 February 1892. In 
Sydney, a number of building societies sent representatives to a meeting to organise a 
Wa,S and forwarded to the Premier who opposed the idea See 
ANU, 22/1/4, Haymarket Building Society, Minute Book, 17 December 1894- 3 14 ^8 
January, 4 March, 16 April 1895. loy4’ 14’ 28 
152 Table Talk. 19 and 26 February 1892. 
15,3™erfe "o lagers for the Freehold, but there are minute books; there are no minute 
books for the other three though there are ledgers. The idea that liquidators would compete 
FeteS??892; flX^S^ Wasrec°gn,sed more generally. SeelableTaJk, 26 
' VromTe Noilintef! 8y7SS''S C°- Minu.e Book s. 
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56 Scorned Hazards of Urban Land Markets: 
Briggs would have appreciated the contrast with quick turnovers during the 
boom. The mood and conduct of business had indeed changed. 
Liquidation of a financial concern of a good size was a lengthy process. TTie 
SMBS had persuaded its depositors to agree to a reorganisation with the threat 
of a ten to twelve year liquidation process. The MPBS did the sarne.^ At die 
1895 Royal Commission hearings, W.G. Brown, a former bank manager 
turned liquidator thought that fifteen to twenty years would be needed for large 
firms. The experience of the Melbourne, Federal, Mercantile, and E&A 
confirm his estimate. With the largest number of assets, the Melbourne 
continued to dispose of property until 1925, although its returns peaked in 
1909. The recovery of money by the other two peaked earlier. None 
experienced a firm market until after 1900 (Figures 8 and 9). 
Summary and Lessons 
Information and data about the operations of land boomers and liquidators 
portray a building cycle of twenty years (1888-1908) from peak to peak. In die 
early and mid 1880s, construction in the transportation sector drew invesunent 
to Melbourne, fhe building of harbour facilities and a railway network that 
focused on Melbourne attracted labour, placing demands on residential space. 
New service businesses and shops also benefitted and required additional space. 
Together the residential and commercial demand caused an expansion in 
building materials suppliers and in die provision of allotments. Once die 
existing stock of structures and allotments had been employed, demand for new 
space escalated. The natural tendency of people to seek to exploit diis 
favourable situation as quickly as possible went unchecked, partly due to the 
business culture of the city. Regardless of whether investors sought long-tenn 
rental income or immediate speculative returns, they required credit. So did 
155 ANU, 24/1/4, MPBS, Minute Books, 11 May 1893. 
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home buyers. Thanks to relaxed corporate and banking legislation, numerous 
lending institutions sprang up. Many of their officers, inexperienced in finance 
or valuation and greedy, lent generously to land developers and builders who 
competed with one another in increasing the supply of allotments, houses, 
shops, and offices. By 1885, the boom was in progress. 
It is difficult to tell when the city became over supplied with houses, office 
space, and allotments; however, the increase in insolvencies of people associated 
with die property industry in 1885-86 and a dip in sales experienced by realtor 
J.R. Buxton seems a portent. Perhaps the increasing insolvencies merely 
heralded die exit of a few of the many minor and inefficient newcomers drawn 
to die boom. In any event, adjustments at die lower end of city-building were 
not going to attract attention, not while brickyards and lumbermills continued 
to expand, not while more late-comers bought into land syndicates. On die basis 
of admittedly thin evidence, it seems feasible that immediate and short-term 
requirements for urban space were being met by the stock available around 
1886, but this was not manifest and business decisions remained grounded on 
optimistic appraisals of the near future. Building societies issued new loans and 
allotment auctions still lured buyers. In certain situations, decisions to buy 
land, survey allotments, build, or expand could not readily be reversed. City 
Properties was a case in point. 
The city-building process entered a more purely speculative phase by 1886. 
The number of land banks and land companies continued to grow through 
1886-88. With benefit of hindsight, an estate agent admitted in March 1889 
that the cuttmg up of rural land into suburban allotments had been ‘overdone in 
Melbourne during the last two years and is now completely stopped.’>56 By 
mid-1888, insiders truly fretted. Auction sales languished. Tims months before 
the Associated Banks increased interest rates and warned they were not 
156 La Trobe Library, Ms 9342, Yeo 
March 1889. Crossthwaite & Co., H. Merrin to Rev. J. Gibson, 1 
prepared to make advances on real estate'57, the speculative land boom had 
ended. Land prices fell; large estates could not be unloaded; land syndicates 
issued calls for capital; stunned investors struggled and made difficult choices 
about which assets to protect. Word spread back to London where, by early 
1889, financiers regarded Melbourne with particular suspicion, ‘everything 
being considered as at 'boom' values.’15* 
The collapse of the land market affected individuals differently. In 1889 
the number of insolvencies shot up, as did the mean value of liabilities (Figure 
10). The building trades and land agency businesses were notable victims. But, 
many speculators held on, hoping for a reversal. As for the affected 
corporations, until mid-1891, as Boehm put it, ‘most urban land mortgage 
companies, surprisingly, were able to survive, and largely to conceal their 
unsound and improper practices.’ Individuals, too, kept afloat, running down 
savings, selling chattels15?, and rescheduling payments. The failure of the land 
market was a prelude to financial collapse, but that crisis was delayed by 
survival strategies and the slow divulging of the shrinkage in value of real estate 
and the extent of losses by banks. 
Boehm denoted two phases to the actual collapse: the crisis among the 
building societies and land banks followed by the crisis among the banks of 
issue. The failure of the building societies and of the largest land speculators 
stemmed from the same phenomena: the illiquidity of land and the limited life 
of desperate ploys of both to stay afloat. In April and May 1893 came the turn 
of the banks whose reorganisation—like those of the building societies that 
157 Turner, A History of Victoria. 292. 
158 UMA, Howden and Lyell Papers, J.McAlister Howden to Thomas Elliston, 17 April 
1889. Howden was working to secure British money for several Melbourne ventures. 
159 UMA, J.R. Buxton Pty. Ltd,, Real Estate Ledgers, entries for 1894. These show a 
growth in the auctions of furniture. Also see for example VPRO, VPRS, 765, unit 5, 
Melbourne Insolvency Court, Insolvency Schedules, 1891-3, file 820-762/72, the 
insolvency schedule of H.P. Hayward. 
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survived—froze deposits.160 Some of the inconvenience of the reduced liquidity 
of land was transferred to local and British investors in the form of deposit 
receipts. These traded at discounts and were sometimes used to purchase real 
property or extinguish mortgage indebtedness.161 These experiments could not 
end die lock-up of assets which impaired die local economy, and a scheme 
proposed in 1892 to establish a Deposit Advance Company which would lend 
against the security of deposit slip never materialised.162 By 1894 and 1895, the 
crisis had shaken the vulnerable operators in the property industry out of the 
city-building process. The number of insolvencies in the building trades and 
real property businesses during those years reached a 25 year low, but now the 
layoffs in the public sector, especially the railway, contributed notably to the 
number of cases. In 1893, only diree public servants had become insolvent, 
however, in 1894 the figure was at least 60 and in 1895 over 50.163 
From 1893 to 1896, the immediate liquidity crisis in land which had 
contributed to the suspension of financial institutions became a perplexing 
liquidity problem for assets disposal firms and reconstructed financial 
institutions. It is not easy to determine precisely when the building cycle began 
to stagger out of depression. The thirty year low for Melbourne insolvencies, 
reached in 1900, potentially illustrates Briggs’ assertion that the personality of 
Melbourne had changed (Figure 10). Risk-takers were rare; and thus so were 
insolvencies. Caution was in the air and this had implications for real property 
markets. Until 1900, these remained saturated as far as immediate requirements 
a"d famK" **** ****•Books- I* October 1894; 
162 Table Tatk. 1 July 1892. 
163 VPRS 757, vol.5. Register of Insolvents, Melbourne Insolvency Court. 
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were concerned. A market for finished houses firmed up in 1900. The MPBS, 
for example, was able to trim its housing stock. But the market for suburban 
land remained soft. There was little willingness—or capacity—to act positively 
regarding the future.164 
A firm recovery in land markets appeared around 1903-05. In 1903, 
sufficient assets had been disposed of by the Melbourne, Federal, and E&A to 
permit their merger as The Melbourne Trust. Sale prices reported by its E&A 
division in 1905 exceeded the revised book values by 40 per cent. By 1908, The 
Mercantile started to buy out other trusts in liquidation. Buying debentures and 
making loans, it was behaving like a financial institution rather than an assets 
disposal firm. So too was the MPBS, much to the annoyance of stock and 
debenture holders in the UK who howled for a larger distribution of money to 
release their deposit receipts and debentures. Only after 1900 did the SMBS 
really resume lending and that was at a comparatively modest level (Figure 2). 
Disabled by the insolvency of one of its partners in 1892 and stilled for more 
than a decade by the general absence of demand for real property, the firm of 
J.R. Buxton made about as many sales in 1906 as in 1888. It almost equalled its 
1884 peak in 1910 when it held a number of land auctions (Figure 6). 
Public discussions and inquiries about the collapse were plentiful in the 
mid-1890s, but reformation projects encountered strong, organised, and varied 
objections from interests wedded to the permissiveness of the 1880s.165 The 
royal commission that examined mortgage lending discovered, for example, 
that not just urban land speculators but farmers also wanted easy money and' 
164 R.V. Jackson was correct in arguing that the hmlr ,„a 
institutions contributed to the economic doubles otvTc.ona ?n fhe'1ZTT" °f 
these problems was the liquidity problem respecting land R V Jackson Aus^^f’ ****"* 
' .he Company Act to wou.d 
Minute Books, 10 September 1896. ’ d Permanent Building Society, 
generous valuations. Attempts to overhaul the company act to prevent assorted 
deceptions were countered with claims that they would obstruct business.166 
However, insolvency measures were tightened. The Melbourne business 
and political community attempted fitfully to apply some lessons from the 
crash.167 Rarely did die inquiries and debates acknowledge the two inherent 
investment problems with land—or indeed—all urban space: the slippery 
constitution of valuation and the liquidity problem. Nearly a century later, in 
another real estate boom, similar difficulties were disregarded. 
166 The reform proposals included the idea that depositors at financial institutions could force 
a special audit, that building societies would be prohibited from taking deposits, and that 
directors could not receive loans from their companies. See Victoria, Parliamentary 
Debates. Session 1896 (Melbourne: Robert S. Brain, Government Printer, 1897), 123-227; 
249-277. For further opposition arguments see Report of the Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council on the Company Act, passim; UMA, Lyell and Howden Papers, The 
Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, History. Report of the Council (Melbourne: 
J.C. Stephens, 1907), 23. 
*67 Cannon. The Land Boomers. 199-208. 
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